Platonismo cum externismo en la epistemología de los experimentos mentales

Jorge Ornelas, Armando Cíntora

Resumen


Platonism cum Externalism in the epistemology of mental experiments.

Two competing conceptions of mental experiments are briefly explained: R. Norton’s Empirism and J. R. Brown’s Platonism. It is argued that some of Norton’s criticisms against Brown’s Platonism are motivated by an internalist epistemology, hence the platonist could defeat these criticisms by availing himself an externalist epistemology.

Key words: mental experiments, Platonism, Empirism, epistemological internalism and externalism.


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Referencias


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