Playing Devil’s advocate methodological relativism and scientific creationism
Resumen
It is argued that if our most basic methodological, axiological and metaphysical scientific presuppositions are not justified, this creates the possibility of a relativism of these very basic presuppositions or foundations.
Key word: Justification, induction, inferential strategy, belief, relativism, dogmatism, rationality, scientific outlook, circularity.
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PDFReferencias
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