La sabiduría de las especies (las poblaciones biológicas como sistemas cognitivos)

Gustavo Caponi

Resumen


The wisdom of the species: biological populations as cognitive systems

Daniel Dennett has insisted in different occasions that Darwin’s Adaptationist Program constitutes a legitimate and hardly displaceable translation of the intentional point of view in the Biology field. However, in order for us to be able to state this thesis clearly and to avoid getting into the domain of mere metaphor—which is not Dennett’s purpose—we have to single out what intentional system the behaviour of which we study on such a perspective. That being noted, we shall argue, contrary to the alternative that Dennett himself picked out, and close to Karl Popper’s suggestion, that such a system is not nature as a whole, but the system made up by a population or a class of organisms: those are the agents of the adaptative processes. We do not, however, aim at contradicting Dennett’s overall strategy; rather, we aim at reinforcing it.

 

Key words: Adaptationism, Darwinism, Dennett, Daniel, cognitive systems, intentional systems, intentional stance, population, selective explanation, species.

 


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