On the possible evolutionary justification of our epistemic capacities

Armando Cíntora

Resumen


The Darwinian justification of the most basic methodological presuppositions of science is criticized; it is argued that this justificatory effort fails because it is viciously circular and because it confuses a causal or historical explanation with justification. Furthermore, even if our cognitive intuitions or dispositions have been selected by evolution, it doesn’t follow that these methodological intuitions are reliable, since survival doesn’t require their reliability, and this in turn implies that a belief in the Darwinian perspective itself could be false.

 

Key words: Evolutionary epistemology, cognitive faculties, evolutionary justification, viciously circular justification, adapatative architecture, innate capacities.


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Referencias


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