¿Pueden pensar los animales no humanos? Algunas consideraciones en defensa del antropomorfismo científico

Oscar David Caicedo M.

Resumen


Can non-human animals think? A defense of scientific anthropomorphism.

The debates on the attribution of mental states to non-human animals has been discussed for a long time. This article presents a critique of Davidson’s “language-centrism” (which holds that organisms without language are unable to produce thoughts), to argue in the defense of a scientific anthropomorphism. The use of this concept is the only way to preserve the evolutionary parsimony that can make viable to study the behavior of animals, if the Darwinian continuity between people and other animals must be kept in the horizon of the behavioral sciences.

 

Key Words. Animal cognition, cognitive ethology, anthropomorphism, anecdanguaotalism, Morgan’s Canon.


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Referencias


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