¿Puede hablarse de una explicación dinamicista en las ciencias cognitivas

Nicolás Venturelli

Resumen


Can we talk about a dynamical explanation in the cognitive sciences?

The central aspects of dynamical explanation in the cognitive sciences are identified and analyzed within the theoretical and methodological assumptions that define the young dynamical approach in the field. My analysis draws on the dynamic field model for the A-not-B error (Thelen, et al. 2001) in developmental psychology, taken as a case study. I attempt to tackle the recent accusations which maintain that the dynamicists’ style of work falls short of being explanatory and is merely descriptive, on account of the extensive use of the mathematical language proper to dynamical systems. Accordingly, the discontinuist pretensions confronted with the classical cognitivist accounts are here further justified, particularly regarding of the underlying notion of explanation.

Key words. Dynamical approach, cognitive scientific explanation, cognitivism, embodied cognitive science, A-not-B error, systematic explanation, mechanism, Esther Thelen, dynamical systems theory, cognitive scientific prediction.

 


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