Las emociones morales como adaptaciones para la cooperación en dilemas sociales
Resumen
Economic experiments have consistently shown that human subjects cooperate in social dilemmas, in spite of the contrary predictions of game theory. Some social scientists have argued that moral emotions can explain this anomaly. I briefly present the experimental evidence for such anomalous behavior and for the thesis that emotions explain it. I argue that moral emotions promote cooperation when integrated into a normative mechanism. The normative mechanism requires the ability to discriminate between cooperators and defectors and facilitates control of the latter. Following Frank (1988), I suggest that the normative mechanism and its moral emotions evolved as a solution to cooperation in social dilemmas, benefiting both the individual and the group.
Key words: Altruism, anomalies, cooperation, emotions, evolution, experimental economics, norms, punishment, selfishness, social dilemmas, temporal discounting.
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