Filosofía animal

Markus Wilde

Resumen


Animal philosophy

The philosophy of animal minds addresses questions concerning the mental life of animals, the difference between animals; and humans, and our moral relation to animals. In the first part, the question of animal thought is answered positively by a naturalistic conception of belief ascription in the case of animals, and some objections are answered. Teleosemantics is introduced as a promising account of animal thought. In the second part, the philosophy of animal minds will be expanded to a special kind of animal, namely human beings. An argument based on animalism for the explanatory continuity between humans and other animals in their mental faculties is introduced.

 Key words. Animal philosophy, animal mind, naturalism, teleosemantics, animalism, anthropological difference.


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Referencias


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