Realismo y antirrealismo en la filosofía de la biología

Antonio Diéguez

Resumen


Realism and antirealism in philosophy of biology

There has been a tendency to think that biology was a breeding ground of realism, and it was supposed that the antirealist could not find therein examples as favorable as those from physics. However, there are in biology analysis concerning some variety of antirealism. We will review here some of the most significant and several conclusions will be drawn with respect to the debate on scientific realism. The aim of this paper is to show, with the help of these examples, that biology has not been absent in this debate and that, far from being a better case for realism, the epistemological controversies raised by specifically biological problems reveal that antirealism can deliver interesting arguments. 

 

Key words: Scientific realism, philosophy of biology, miracle argument, incommensurability, social constructivism, antirealism about entities, antirealism about theories, pluralism, level of selection, species.

 


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Referencias


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