Lorenz’s philosophical naturalism in the mirror of contemporary science studies

Werner Callebaut

Resumen


Although major tenets of Lorenz’s hypothetical-realist evolutionary epistemology have not withstood close philosophical scrutiny, by and large his philosophical naturalism can still inspire us today. To prepare the ground for my argument I interpret some key aspects of the current debate about the significance of Lorenz’s scientific and philosophical achievements from the perspective of science studies, viz., the history, philosophy, and social studies of science. I move on to assess Lorenz’s peculiar brand of evolutionary naturalism in the light of the booming development of philosophical naturalism in the last three decades. Contemporary philosophical naturalism as I understand it may be defined in terms of four attitudes: (i) the articulation of philosophy in a way that is continuous with scientific method and explanation; (ii) anti-transcendence (Diesseitigkeit); (iii) an anti-transcendental stance that requires abandoning the ambition of finding epistemological foundations, and (iv) a deep appreciation of the bounded rationality of all cognizing systems, whether human, animal, or artificial. Lorenz’s views, in particular in “The innate forms of possible experience” (1943) and Behind the Mirror (1973/1977), provide a powerful antidote for a variety of unwarranted anti-naturalistic leanings that persist in epistemology and the philosophy of mind to this very day.

 

Key words: Adaptationism, bounded rationality, context of justification, evolutionary epistemology, Konrad Lorenz, Immanuel Kant, philosophical naturalism, transcendence, transcendental arguments.

 


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