El debate filosófico en torno a la explicación de unicidad de la facultad lingüística humana

Adriana Gonzalo, Daniel Blanco

Resumen


The philosophical debate on the explanation of the unicity of the human language faculty

This contribution explicates some aspects of the recent debate within the context of generative linguistic regarding the explanation for the phylogenetic origin of the language faculty in humans. Two positions involved in the discussions about scientific explanation are distinguished and philosophically analyzed in the light of the structuralist program for science. In our analysis, we consider the phenomenon to be explained-explanandum—and show its distinct characterization in both postures. This fact affects the decision about which theory is applied for its explanation-explanans—together with the role played by the theory of natural selection. The explanatory proposals of the two evaluated positions are schematically reconstructed, and we critically discuss some epistemological issues involved in the debate.

 

Key words. Adaptation; Chomsky; communication; evolution; faculty of language; philosophical explication; scientific explanation; spandrel, structuralist program; theory of natural selection.


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