Perspectivas evolutivas sobre la cognición. El compromiso de la hipótesis de la “mente extendida” con un enfoque biológico evolutivo

Resumen

Evolutionary perspectives on cognition. The compromise of the “extended mind” hypothesis with an evolutionary view.

In this paper I focus on the scopes and limitations of the extended cognition’s compromise with an evolutionary theory. I evaluate whether the incorporation of such theory for the explanation of cognition provides significant advantages and, if such is the case, how so. First, I consider what implies to be an extended mind and what constitute its boundaries. At this point, I refer to embedded cognition as an assumption of the aforementioned hypothesis, as well as the debate on the limits of extension. Next, I evaluate to what point this extended mind hypothesis involves a compromise with certain links between organism and environment—links dependent on an evolutionary theory—constitutive of the extended mind approach. I thus concentrate on two mains issues of the extended hypothesis: the notion of “representation” as an adaptive action, and the assumption of the term “niche” within the frame of its cognition model.

Key Words. Cognitive niche, mental representation, cognition, embodied approach, extended mind, evolution, adaptation, 007 Principle, scaffolding, enactive approach.